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Abstract 
Paragraph 139 of the World Summit Outcome Document (WSOD) stipulates that the international 
community should respond in a ‘timely and decisive manner’ when 'national authorities are manifestly 
failing to protect their populations' from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic 
cleansing. But what constitutes a 'manifest failing'? The ambiguity that surrounds the phrase is 
positive in that it enables flexibility as states act on a ‘case-by-case’ basis, however, it also heightens 
fears of great power manipulation. Furthermore, there is an inconsistent discourse as many R2P 
scholars as well as the 2010 U.S., and 2008 U.K., National Security Strategy’s continue to use the 
phrase 'unable or unwilling' despite the fact that this does not appear in the WSOD. As we approach 
the WSOD’s 10th anniversary, this article asks R2P scholars and practitioners to pause and consider 
what terminology they are using and why. Finally, it suggests five ways in which R2P research can 
proceed. 
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Paragraph 139 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document (WSOD) stipulates 
that the international community has a responsibility to act in a ‘timely and decisive’ 
manner  through the UN Security Council, on a ‘on a case-by-case basis’, when 
‘national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations’ from genocide, 
war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing.1 The statement begins to 
illustrate that within the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) framework, the ‘manifest 
failing’ requirement represents threshold. The UN Security Council has to agree that 
the state is question is ‘manifestly failing’ to protect its populations from genocide, 
war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing before it can take 
collective action against the state in question. The importance of the ‘manifest failing’ 
requirement has been re-affirmed by the UN General Assembly (UNGA) on many 
occasions since, ‘Only if and when a State manifestly fails to fulfil such obligation 
may the international community take collective action in accordance with the 
Charter’.2 But this raises the question, what constitutes a ‘manifest failing’? The 
phrase was introduced in the final drafting stage of the WSOD in order to replace the 
terminology ‘unable or unwilling’ but the WSOD, subsequent UN reports, and indeed 
R2P scholarship offers little to guide decision makers in determining when a state is 
‘manifestly failing’. As a result, there is no clear benchmark against which to assess 
the behaviour of the host state in order to gauge whether it is ‘manifestly failing’ in its 
R2P. 
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Although the issue of conceptual vagueness is, in itself, enough to warrant 
further investigation, a secondary interrelated problem emerges when one considers 
the inconsistency that is evident in the R2P discourse. For example, the 2010 U.S., 
and 2008 U.K., National Security Strategy’s continue to use the phrase ‘unable or 
unwilling’ even though it does not appear in the WSOD.3 Thus, in a rather striking 
twist, the very states that have implemented the R2P most explicitly (at least since 
2009) for example, the intervention in Libya in 20114, continue to use the incorrect 
terminology at least according to what was agreed on at the World Summit. 
Furthermore, R2P scholars use an array of different interpretations and phrases. As 
will be discussed below, some scholars claim that ‘manifest failing’ was introduced 
because it is less subjective than ‘unable or unwilling’, others claim that it was 
introduced to raise the threshold for intervention, whilst others claim the two phrases 
mean the same thing and even offer a hybrid formulation. The mix therefore, of both 
different phrases and contrasting interpretations, only adds to the confusion and 
complexity that surrounds the identification of a ‘manifest failing’. More importantly, 
this feeds into concerns that Western states may manipulate the ambiguity that 
surrounds the threshold for a pillar three action which has become more prominent 
following the controversial regime change in Libya. As we approach the 10th 
anniversary of the WSOD, this article asks R2P scholars and practitioners to pause 
and consider what terminology they are using and why and calls for further research 
to be conducted in this area. 
The article is structured in a two-fold format. Section one documents the 
terminology transition from ‘unable or unwilling’ to ‘manifest failing’ to highlight the 
problems of ambiguity and inconsistency. Section two identifies five ways in which 
scholars and practitioners may address the issues at stake, first, reject this research 
agenda; second, do nothing; third, drop the ‘manifest failing’ requirement; fourth, 
revert to using the phrase ‘unable or unwilling’; and fifth, establish indicators of a 
‘manifest failing’ and in so doing, highlights five indicators that could form the basis 
for future research.  
 
From ‘unable or unwilling’ to ‘manifest failing’  
The phrase ‘manifest failing’ was introduced in the final drafting stage of the 
WSOD in order to replace the terminology ‘unable or unwilling’, but the WSOD offers 
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little to guide decision makers in determining when a state is ‘manifestly failing’. It 
may be claimed that the phrase is so transparent that there is no need for clarity; 
after all, the word manifest means ‘evident to the eye, mind, or judgement; obvious’.5 
But when this understanding is applied to the assessment of whether a host state is 
‘manifestly failing’ to protect its population from genocide, war crimes, crimes against 
humanity, and ethnic cleansing, what evidence is required? If it is the case that proof 
of one of the four crimes being carried out is necessary to warrant a pillar three 
response then the requirement of a ‘manifest failing’ would not be needed. Moreover, 
from a legal perspective, the killing of just one person or a small group of people, for 
example a group of hostages, could constitute genocide but it is highly doubtful that 
anyone would argue that this represents a ‘manifestly failing’.6 It is important 
therefore to consider that the most controversial pillar of the R2P (which includes 
wide range of non-coercive response measures under Chapters VI and VIII of the 
Charter as well coercive measures under Chapter VII7) is grounded, in part, on an 
ambiguous phrase. 
In its original formulation the R2P was based on the idea that the international 
community would respond when states were ‘unable or unwilling’ to protect their 
populations from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic 
cleansing.8  
The emerging principle in question is that intervention for human protection purposes, 
including military intervention in extreme cases, is supportable when major harm to 
civilians is occurring or imminently apprehended, and the state in question is unable or 
unwilling to end the harm, or is itself the perpetrator (emphasis added). 
9
 
 
The statement highlights that the phrase ‘unable or unwilling’ goes right to the very 
heart of the R2P.10 As the report goes on to explain, ‘it is only if the state is unable or 
unwilling to fulfill this responsibility, or is itself the perpetrator, that it becomes the 
responsibility of the international community to act in its place’.11 Accordingly, the 
responsibility to respond could only be triggered if the UN Security Council agreed 
that the state in question was ‘unable or unwilling’ to protect its population from 
genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing. This exact 
understanding was restated in the 2004 Report of the UN Secretary-General’s High 
Level Panel,12 the 2005 Report of the UN Secrteray-General,13 and applied 
practically to the assessment of the Sudanese regime by the International 
Commission on the Inquiry of Darfur.14  
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It is important therefore to stress that that phrase ‘manifest failing’ did not 
appear in any of the R2P precursory documents yet appears in paragraph 139 of the 
WSOD:  
The international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility 
to use appropriate diplomatic humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance 
with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, to help protect populations from genocide, 
war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. In this context, we are 
prepared, to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner through the 
Security Council in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-
case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organisations as appropriate, 
should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing 
to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes 
against humanity. 
15
  
 
  
The statement captures the fact that the third pillar of the R2P embodies a dual 
element as the international community has to assess primarily, whether one of the 
four crimes has been committed and secondarily, whether the state in question is 
‘manifestly failing’ to protect the population from these crimes.16 But what constitutes 
a ‘manifest failing’?  
To gain some clarity on where the phrase ‘manifest failing’ came from, this 
author contacted the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect (GCR2P) and 
was informed   
There will be no documents on this point. At the final days of negotiation, all was 
done very very informally with no official drafts but through discussions of a few of the 
key drafters. Manifest failure was a Canadian suggestion, trying to remove the 
subjectivity of “unable or unwilling” that had appeared in previous drafts, and insert 
what they believed to be a more evidence-based standard. It was accepted without 
difficulty.
17
 
 
According to the GCR2P the phrase ‘manifest failing’ was included to overcome the 
subjective problems that a few key drafters felt may arise over international society’s 
ability to evidence that a state is ‘unable or unwilling’ to prevent  genocide, war 
crimes, crimes against humanity or ethnic cleansing. Notably, this is a very different 
reason to that put forward by leading R2P scholars which underlines the confusion to 
be found in the discourse (see below) but even if one accepts the view set out above 
it is not clear, a) how the phrase ‘manifest failing’ is more objective than ‘unable or 
unwilling’ and b) what evidence is required to prove a ‘manifest failing’ is taking 
place. Furthermore, the  ‘very very informal’ nature of the negotiation leaves one 
questioning whether the drafters even realised that they were perhaps creating 
unintentional problems that could potentially hinder the implementation of the R2P in 
the future. As Carsten Stahn explains, ‘the requirement of a manifest failure may be 
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used as an additional means to challenge the legality and timing of collective security 
action’.18  
Since 2005 it is evident that there have been high profile concerns regarding 
the identification of a ‘manifest failing’. For example, in 2008, the Asia Pacific Centre 
for the Responsibility to Protect, University of Queensland, used the $2 million of 
funding provided by the Australian government to fund fourteen R2P research 
projects throughout the globe, including, Washington, Vancouver, Jakarta, 
Singapore, Oxford and New York.19 The very fact that the research was funded gives 
weight to this paper’s claim that there are unresolved issues surrounding the 
identification of a ‘manifest failing’.20 Of relevance here is that one of the projects 
focuses on, Assessing the Parameters for Identifying a ‘Manifest Failure’ to Protect 
Populations under R2P. This is led Professor Rosenberg who is conducting on-going 
research into this area.21 In the policy brief that stemmed from that research project, 
Rosenberg and Strauss establish four principles which are aimed to standardise R2P 
implementation by providing a systematic and coherent approach.22 Significantly, 
principle four sets out to ‘determine whether a State is “manifestly failing” to meet its 
responsibility to protect’.23 But as this was published as part of a policy brief series 
entitled ‘R2P ideas in brief’ the reader is presented with a 97 word explanation that 
culminates in the claim, a ‘manifest failure occurs when relatively foreseeable 
consequences have not been addressed and the risk level prevails or increases’.24  
Although this author does not reject the formulation put forward by Rosenberg 
and Strauss it seems fair to say that more research on this issue is needed. As 
Labonte explains, ‘Research on the concept of manifest failure and its relationship to 
R2P is relatively new, even within the burgeoning literature that now exists on R2P 
itself’.25 This is despite the fact that the ‘manifest failing’ requirement has remained a 
key component of seminal UN reports on the R2P. For example, Ban Ki-moon’s first 
report on the R2P in 2009 raised the ‘manifest failing’ requirement nine times and his 
fourth R2P report specifically on ‘timely and decisive response’ cited it five times.26  It 
has also featured prominently in UN discussions, for example, it was cited twelve 
times in the UN General Assembly’s first (of what have now become annual 
discussions) ‘informal interactive dialogue’ on the R2P. Each time underlining the 
centrality and importance of the ‘manifest failing’ threshold, ‘The horrors of the 
twentieth century inform the final pillar, namely, that timely and decisive action within 
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the Charter is an option on the table should a State be manifestly failing in its 
obligation to protect’.27 The UNGA went as far as stating, ‘Therefore, if a State has 
manifestly failed to do so, the international community has the moral obligation to 
give a timely and decisive response’.28 Yet despite the significance attributed to the 
identification of a ‘manifest failing’, none of these reports shed light on the evidence 
needed.  
If ambiguity is one issue, inconsistency is another. The most important 
deviation from the terminology expressed in the WSOD is evident in the 2010 U.S. 
National Security Strategy:  
The United States and all member states of the U.N. have endorsed the concept of the 
“Responsibility to Protect.” In so doing, we have recognized that the primary 
responsibility for preventing genocide and mass atrocity rests with sovereign 
governments, but that this responsibility passes to the broader international 
community when sovereign governments themselves commit genocide or mass 
atrocities, or when they prove unable or unwilling to take necessary action to prevent 
or respond to such crimes inside their borders.
29
   
 
As the above statement highlights, the U.S. continues to use the terminology ‘unable 
or unwilling’ even though this does not appear in the WSOD. This is also evident in 
the 2008 UK National Security Strategy which states, ‘where a government is 
unwilling or unable to protect its citizens from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing 
or crimes against humanity, or is perpetrating these acts itself, the international 
“Responsibility to Protect” ultimately requires the international community to act’.30 
To be clear, neither mention ‘manifest failing’. Thus, the very states that have been 
at the forefront of R2P endorsement and implementation (at least since 2009) use 
terminology that differs from that agreed to in the WSOD. On this point further 
research is needed on whether the changes made were conscious or unconscious. 
As interpretivist scholars such as Bevir have highlighted, even if it is the latter, 
careful consideration needs to be given as to how unconscious utterances and 
designs can impact on the behaviour of the actors involved as well as the shape the 
discourse itself.31 
To consider the implications of inconsistency further let us juxtapose the 
National Security Strategy’s above with the idea that the phrase ‘manifest failing’ was 
introduced in 2005 in order to raise the threshold for a pillar three action from ‘unable 
or unwilling’ to a ‘manifest failing’.32 As Alex Bellamy explains, ‘[t]o appease the US 
and G77, the threshold at which the responsibility for dealing with genocide and 
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mass atrocities passed from the host state to international society was altered’ from 
‘unable or unwilling’ to ‘a manifest failure to protect civilians – a significantly higher 
threshold’.33 Although Bellamy does not offer a citation to explain where this thinking 
comes from – which again underlines the diverse range of interpretations on offer  - 
his position captures a common trend which interprets the terminology change as a 
conscious attempt to raise the threshold for a third pillar action. However, to return to 
the National Security Strategy’s of the U.S. and the U.K., the grave concern here is 
that if it is the case that ‘manifest failing’ was introduced to raise the threshold for 
intervention, then the use of ‘unable or unwilling’ by the U.S., and U.K may 
exacerbate non-Western fears that Western states [mis]use the R2P as a tool for 
their own personal agenda. For example, the political fallout that surrounded Libya 
as states such as Russia, China, India, Guatemala, Australia, Brazil, and South 
Africa criticised the implementation of UN Resolution 1973 stemmed from concerns 
that ‘[t]here is a growing perception that the concept of the responsibility to protect 
might be misused for purposes other than protecting civilians, such as regime 
change.’34   
The idea that Western states may manipulate the ambiguity that surrounds 
the threshold for a pillar three action was put into explicit context by Ruan Zonge in 
2012,  
There are so far no objective criterions to judge if “a country is unwilling or unable to 
execute responsibility to protect” and therefore it is likely that it would become another 
excuse for some countries to impose armed intervention in the internal affairs of other 
countries.
35
  
 
Although one has to be careful not to extrapolate too much from one source, it is 
important to bear in mind that Zonge is the Vice President of the China Institute for 
International Studies which is the Chinese foreign ministry’s think tank which also 
hosted the first ever policy discussion on China and the R2P.36 Accordingly, it seems 
that whilst there are broader concerns over how Western states utilise the R2P 
concept, there are also very specific fears regarding the lack of criteria that 
surrounds the threshold for pillar three response measures. Putting aside the fact 
that Zonge uses the phrase ‘unable or unwilling’ rather than ‘manifest failing’ the 
statement indicates that there is a genuine concern that Western states may 
manipulate the ambiguity that surrounds the R2P. This feeds into the broader debate 
over the Security Dilemma as it may be the perception of what Western states are 
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doing, rather than what they are actually doing, that heightens mistrust and fear 
which hinder cooperation.37 For example, if as Bellamy claims, the phrase ‘manifest 
failing’ was introduced to raise the threshold for intervention then how are Chinese 
policymakers meant to interpret the fact that the U.S. and the U.K., use the phrase 
‘unable or unwilling’ in their National Security Strategies? Are Western states 
consciously trying to lower the threshold for a pillar three intervention, or is this 
simply just an unconscious mistake?  
When one considers that implementation of the R2P rests on a consensus 
being forged amongst the P5 then the one can see how tensions may arise in the 
legitimacy process as states invoke different terminology when deciding what 
constitutes ‘rightful conduct’.38 For example, Michael Swaine’s analysis of China’s 
18th Work Report from November 2012 argues that China has set out an 
‘unprecedented’ commitment to ‘oppose any foreign attempt to subvert the legitimate 
government of any other countries’ which it is claimed stems from China’s concerns 
regarding the R2P.39 But at the same time, Swaine explains that the statement is 
worded in such a manner as to imply that there could be an R2P intervention where 
it was deemed that an illegitimate government was in place. But what constitutes an 
illegitimate government?  To return to Zonge’s statement, it seems that China may 
favour the establishment of criteria for aiding such assessments yet this is something 
which divides R2P scholars and has not been addressed because of the lack of 
research in this area.  
Problematically, if policymakers look to R2P scholars for clarity on this issue it 
is not evident that they will find it. For example, Mónica Serrano informs the reader 
that the international community has a R2P ‘if states are manifestly failing – that is, if 
they are unable or unwilling to protect their populations from these crimes’.40 The 
statement offers a radically different interpretation to that offered by GR2P in that 
Serrano does not view ‘manifest failing’ as more objective and instead views the two 
phrases are synonymous with one another. But of course, if this were true then why 
was the change of terminology in 2005 even needed? Yet Serrano is not alone in 
offering interpretations which directly challenge the idea that there is any difference 
between the two phrases. For example, Thomas Weiss offers a hybrid formulation as 
he refers to states that are ‘manifestly unable’ and ‘unable or manifestly unwilling’.41 
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Again, this interpretation seems to implicitly reject the idea that ‘manifest failing’ is 
somehow less subjective than ‘unable or unwilling’.  
Before one accepts the view that the two phrases mean the same thing – 
which is obviously not what the drafters of the WSOD felt – consider that in 2009 the 
UN General Assembly stated, ‘Lastly, the third pillar deals with situations where a 
State manifestly fails in its responsibility, due to unwillingness rather than inability’.42 
The statement reflects a clear attempt to draw a distinction between a state that is 
‘unable’ to protect its population from genocide, war crimes, crimes against 
humanity, and ethnic cleansing as opposed to a state that is ‘unwilling’ to do so. It is 
only the latter that is considered to constitute a ‘manifest failing’. This perspective is 
evidently influenced by Ban Ki-moon’s 2009 report (which it refers to as it mentions 
the ‘third pillar’) in that a state that is ‘unable’ to fulfil its R2P would require state 
assistance which would be classified as a pillar two operation whereas a state that is 
‘unwilling’ suggests a pillar three action is required in that that the international 
community would have to utilise its coercive and non-coercive measures under 
Chapters VI, VII, and VIII of the UN Charter in order to try and alter the unwillingness 
of the state in question. This interpretation therefore directly challenges the idea that 
‘manifest failing’ is more objective than ‘unable or unwilling’ as it is evident that the 
‘unwilling’ element of the latter formulation is actually utilised to make sense of the 
‘manifest failing’ requirement. Moreover, it is clear that the UNGA did not set out to 
treat ‘unable and unwillingness’ as interchangeable with ‘manifest failing’. The point 
here is not to judge the range of interpretations but to simply highlight the lack of 
clarity that is evident within the discourse 
In short, the variety of uses above illustrate an inconsistent discourse which 
only adds to the confusion that surrounds the question of what constitutes a 
‘manifest failing’. As a result, legitimate questions can be raised over whether the 
actors involved are even conscious of the terminology change and the language that 
they themselves use. When I have raised this issue with a number of R2P scholars 
they have admitted that they were unaware that the WSOD does not include the 
phrase ‘unable or unwilling’. In policy terms, a Political Affairs Officer for the UN 
Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect also informed me 
that the Office was unaware of the inconsistencies to be found the discourse. It is 
therefore important that actors pause and consider what terminology they are using 
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and why. Essentially, this helps explain why this author cannot present the reader 
with an empirical example in which a debate, between policymakers or R2P 
scholars, has taken place over whether a host state has in fact ‘manifestly failed’ or 
is ‘unwilling or unable’ or is something else entirely. The reason is that because the 
actors involved may not even be conscious of terminology that they use we do not 
see heated exchanges framed in these terms; however, to return to the premise of 
this paper, this should not distract us from the central issue of threshold.  
 
Potential Future Directions of Research 
i) Option one: reject this research agenda 
The reader may reject the idea of developing the ‘manifest failing’ research agenda 
on the grounds that it does not matter what phrase is used, the decision to react is a 
political choice based on things other than a ‘manifest failing’, such as the national 
interest, sovereignty, and the complexities of intervention.43 For example, as Bellamy 
rightly points out, ‘France (in relation to Myanmar) and Russia (in relation to Georgia) 
used RtoP to justify the actual or potential use of coercive force in contexts where 
there was no apparent manifest failure to protect populations from genocide and 
mass atrocities.’44 Moreover, the lack of clarity regarding a ‘manifest failing’ did not 
prevent a consensus on Libya, Mali, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Yemen. 
From this view, R2P scholarship should not get bogged down in a research agenda 
which has no impact on the decision making process and should focus instead on 
other issues such as UN reform.45  
Essentially, this critique forms part of a broader debate regarding the importance 
of words in international relations. Neorealists such as Mearsheimer have explicitly 
rejected the influence of words whereas interpretivists such as Epstein have 
emphasised ‘the power of words in international relations’.46 Although the 
parameters of this article cannot address this debate in detail, it is necessary to 
highlight that this author is not trying to overstate the importance of words or 
downplay factors such as power politics and the national interest. Yet at the same 
time it is important to bear in mind that within the R2P framework (as set out in the 
WSOD and many UN Reports since) the ‘manifest failing’ requirement represents 
threshold. Whether this is framed in terms of illegitimacy, irresponsibility, an 
escalation in violence, unable or unwilling, or manifest failure, the underlying logic is 
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that of threshold: a line has been crossed in that what was tolerated yesterday 
cannot be today and action has to be taken. When one considers, to return to Zonge, 
that there are genuine fears of Great Power manipulations – between the Great 
Powers themselves – it seems fair to suggest that the potential for establishing an 
intersubjective consensus at the international level regarding the identification of a 
’manifest failing’ may be beneficial in the long term despite the continued 
significance of other factors such as the national interest and power politics.  
 
 
ii) Option two: do nothing 
From this perspective it is better not to have indicators as an individual assessment 
should be done on a ‘case-by-case basis’ as set out in paragraph 139 of the WSOD: 
‘we are prepared, to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner through 
the Security Council in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-
by-case basis.’47 The case-by-case approach has two significant strengths that 
should not be overlooked. First, it would be a mistake to claim that a ‘one-size-fits-all’ 
approach can be established as mass atrocity crimes are far too complex for any 
single framework to provide a solution.48 For example, the debates over the causes 
of genocide alone highlight that no one approach can provide the silver bullet.49 
Second, the ‘case-by-case’ logic allows flexibility. This is a fundamentally important 
point and to return to the construction of the UN Charter, its architects deliberately 
used ‘language that was adaptable enough to allow application under unforeseen 
circumstances in years to come’.50 In other words, if guidelines are too rigid, then 
ultimately this hinders rather than helps the application of policies which again 
underlines the need to assess each R2P crisis on a ‘case-by-case’ basis.  
Although this UN perspective is the dominant view found in the discourse, 
there are a number of issues that need to be thought through. First, any attempt to 
create a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach is flawed but, as Bellamy highlights, it is important 
to differentiate between the interpretation of the R2P and the application of it. 51 For 
example, the UN Secretary-General states, ‘[a]s each situation is different, it would 
be counterproductive to try and make the application of these principles appear 
identical in all situations’.52 The statement sets out the case that the application of the 
R2P should be shaped by the circumstances involved and the point here is not to 
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dispute that claim. The response of the international community should differ on a 
case-by-case basis; after all, ‘foreign policy must always operate within what Edmund 
Burke termed “the empire of circumstances”’.53 But in order to help make the R2P 
sustainable in the 21st century our interpretation of the concept should be consistent 
and a part of this has to be raising awareness of, and addressing the issues that 
surround, ‘manifest failing’. Second, even on a ‘case-by-case basis’ states will have 
to appeal to something in order to make the case that a threshold has been passed. 
This restates the need to address the ambiguity that surrounds ‘manifest failing’ and 
gives weight to the idea that indicators may help aid decision makers in making their 
assessment of a ‘manifest failing’ thus improving the ability of the UN to fulfil its own 
commitment to respond in a ‘timely and decisive’ manner. It is important therefore to 
understand that establishing indicators compliments the UN approach rather than 
challenges it – though there is still the issue of flexibility which is discussed below 
(see option four). 
 
iii) Option three: drop the ‘manif st failing’ requirement 
One can easily imagine the following argument being made; surely, if any amount of 
genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, or ethnic cleansing is taking place, 
then this demands a pillar three response. From this perspective ‘manifest failing’ is 
an epistemic requirement which should be dropped as proving that one of the four 
crimes has taken place is enough to warrant a pillar three response. Although this 
author is sympathetic to this line of thinking, it is rejected on the pragmatic grounds 
that, a small scale example of genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, or 
ethnic cleansing may take place which would not meet the threshold required to 
merit a pillar three response. From a legal perspective a war crime can take place if 
private property is targeted,54 and as aforementioned, genocide could be deemed to 
have taken place if just one person or a group of hostages were killed, as long as it 
was proven that their murder was intended to destroy their national, racial, ethnic, or 
religious group in whole or in part.55 It is highly doubtful that anyone would interpret 
this as a ‘manifest failing’. Although these are extremes they feed into Robert Pape’s 
recent critique of the R2P when he asks ‘[w]hat kind of war crime?’ and ‘[w]hat kind 
of ethnic cleansing?’ requires international action.56 Surely the decision to insert a 
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threshold qualifier (whether it is ‘manifest failing’ or ‘unable or unwilling’) stems from 
this understanding.  
 
iv) Option four: going back to move forward 
From this perspective the phrase ‘unable or unwilling’ should be used rather than 
‘manifest failing’ on the grounds that the former has more purchase and is therefore 
better for assessing when a state has failed in its R2P. The most significant reason 
to support this course of action is the fact that the U.S. and U.K. are utilising the 
phrase ‘unable or unwilling’ in their National Security Strategies. This is important 
because if the R2P is to be further entrenched as a norm in 21st century 
policymaking then the role of the powerful is pivotal. As Theresa Reinhold explains in 
her analysis of ‘hegemonic law-making’ and the R2P, it is not that the U.S. can 
command states to adhere to the R2P (or even wants to) but in order for the R2P to 
have a successful life-cycle it remains dependent upon U.S. support.57 Indeed, it 
may be that no amendment is made to paragraph 139 but yet the phrase ‘unable or 
unwilling’ gradually replaces ‘manifest failing’ in the discourse precisely because 
powerful actors such as the U.S. and U.K. start to use this phrase more. As stated 
above however, actors such as the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, explicitly 
talk in terms of ‘manifest failure’ rather than ‘unable or unwilling’. Moreover, it is easy 
to expect a backlash as non-Western states question the motives of the U.S. and 
U.K. if they suggest a terminology change, especially if this is interpreted as an 
attempt to lower the threshold for intervention rather than as an attempt to establish 
clearer indicators. This fear is further exacerbated by the historical and political 
baggage that surrounds the phrase ‘unable or unwilling’: ‘[t]he United States has 
long articulated the “unable or unwilling” standard to justify the use of force in self-
defence in response to terrorist attacks’.58 Thus, the case could be made that in a 
post-911 world it is important to distance the R2P and mass atrocity prevention from 
counter-terrorism and the ‘War on Terror’ – especially as the invasion of Iraq 
threatened the concept’s very existence.59 On this fourth option, the jury is still out as 
there is no way of knowing how the R2P norm will develop, but concerns remain as 
one can see the potential for tensions to emerge between actors using different 
terminology.  
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Option five: establish indicators for assessment 
v) From this perspective, actors should establish indicators that can help an 
assessment of what constitutes a ‘manifestly failure’. This author is conscious here 
that any attempt to establish criteria may fall into the trap of reducing the complexity 
of irresponsible sovereignty down to an over simplistic tick-list. For example, in Oliver 
O’Donovan’s analysis of Just War Theory, he claims that modern textbooks tend 
present the theory as seven criteria which have a ‘disconcertingly legalist feel to 
them, ticking off principles, as it were, one by one’.60 In a similar vein, it seems 
inappropriate to suggest that an assessment of whether a state has in fact 
‘manifestly failed’ can be done through a box ticking exercise. Moreover, such an 
approach would hinder the flexibility needed as outlined in option one. That said, 
there is a reason why Just War theorists continually use criteria as these help 
provide a general framework for identifying a just war. In essence, everyone involved 
is aware that the judgement is complex but appeal to criteria in order to establish a 
‘common reference within which argumentation can take place’.61 At present the R2P 
discourse does not have this common reference point but at the same time those 
that wish to pursue this research agenda need to address the issue of flexibility 
which is aided by the ‘case-by-case’ approach outlined above.  
This final option proposes that analysts begin to put together a framework for 
judgment in the same way that Just War theorists do. It is with such thinking in mind 
that this author has produced the first tentative steps toward establishing a list of 
specific criteria through a case study analysis of the on-going crisis in Syria.62 In so 
doing, the research puts forward five key indicators of a ‘manifest failing’: i) 
government intentions, ii) weapons used, iii) death toll, iv) number of people 
displaced, and v) the intentional targeting of civilians, especially women, children and 
the elderly. Essentially, these act to try and identify the qualitative and quantitative 
indicators that actors invoke when attempting to make the case that the threshold of 
a ‘manifest failing’ has been reached. In so doing, the case study analysis of Syria 
also highlights the need to get to grips with the confusion and chaos that academics 
and policymakers face when analysing the issue of a ‘manifest failing’ within the 
context of warfare.63 This is a key component highlighted in the UN Secretary-
General Ban Ki-moon’s fifth report on R2P (since 2009) as he highlights the need to 
navigate the ‘overlap’ between ‘armed conflict’ and ‘atrocity crimes’.64 Of course, 
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further research is needed but of establishing indicators are three fold. First, they will 
provide policy makers with a set of guidelines that could help the UN fulfil its 
commitment to respond in a 'timely and decisive manner'. Second, they could help 
ease fears that Western states are manipulating the ambiguity that surrounds the 
phrase 'manifest failure'. Third, they may aid both those inside and outside 
government who wish to hold policymakers to account by creating a framework 
against which political [in]action can be judged. Although the identification of five 
criteria, as outlined above, may seem somewhat simplistic, one should remember 
that the identification of between three and seven criteria (this has changed over 
time) has been used to guide assessments of what constitutes a Just War from St. 
Aquinas to present day. 
 
Conclusion 
Although there have been many crises since 2005 that could be classified under the 
R2P umbrella, it is important to bear in mind that pillar three actions remain less 
frequent than pillar two responses. Notably therefore, in the aftermath of the 
controversial regime change in Libya, concerns over the potential for Western 
manipulation of the R2P and more specifically the threshold that surrounds pillar 
three action began to emerge more prominently. Resolving these concerns will not 
be easy. Ten years on from the WSOD, an analysis of the R2P discourse underlines 
the ambiguity that surrounds the ‘manifest failing’ requirement as well as the 
inconsistency that stems from different actors invoking diverse interpretations and 
using different phrases. Accordingly, this article asks scholars and practitioners to 
pause and consider what terminology they are using and why. Moreover, it calls for a 
more consistent discourse to be established based on a more informed 
understanding of what constitutes a ‘manifest failing’. To facilitate this, the article set 
out five options to aid R2P scholarship as it moves forward, each of which raise a 
series of questions and issues. Again it is worth stressing that this author does not 
want to downplay the importance of other factors such as power politics and the 
national interest, however, since the ‘manifest failing’ requirement represents the 
threshold for a pillar three response to be actioned, and when one considers that the 
lives of potentially millions of people may depend on the third pillar of the R2P being 
triggered, the importance of this issue cannot be overstated. Potentially, this gives 
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further credence to the idea that an independent body should be set up to make 
rulings on such issues,65 a part of which has to be whether a ‘manifest failing’ is 
taking place.  
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